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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the predictive power of a partisan conflict on income inequality. Our study 
contributes to the existing literature by using the newly introduced nonparametric causality-in-
quantile testing approach to examine how political polarization in the United States affects 
several measures of income inequality and distribution overtime. The study uses annual time-
series data between the periods 1917-2013. We find evidence in support of a dynamic causal 
relationship between partisan conflict and income inequality, except at the upper end of the 
quantiles. Our empirical findings suggest that a reduction in partisan conflict will lead to a 
reduction in our measures of income inequality, but this requires that inequality is not 
exceptionally high. 
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1. Introduction 
The income inequality in the United States has followed a roller coaster pattern over the 
twentieth century into the early twenty-first century. Goldin and Margo (1992) coined the 
phrase "Great Compression" to describe the movement in income inequality following the 
Great Depression. The Great Compression saw a large reduction in income inequality. 
Krugman (2007) coined the phrase Great Divergence after the Great Compression. This period 
that continues through the present saw a large increase in income inequality. Piketty and Saez 
(2003) conclude that the Great Compression ended in the 1970s and then entered the Great 
Divergence phase. Of course, the Great Depression preceded the Great Compression and the 
Great Moderation and the Great Recession occurred during the Great Divergence. 1 
Significant efforts attempt to explain the roller coaster movements in income inequality, 
especially the transition from the Great Compression to the Great Divergence. A number of 
hypotheses exist in the literature, including diverging returns to different levels of education 
and training, the decline in unionization rates, trade liberalization, higher rates of immigration, 
increased presence of single parent families, and the decline in the real minimum wage (see 
Kuznets 1955; Jenkins 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Atkinson, 1997, 2000; Li and 
Zou, 1998) 
Our paper suggests a significant role for partisan conflict in explaining movements in 
U.S. income inequality. Government can affect income inequality through its efforts at income 
redistribution (Kelly 2004) as well as setting the rules of the game that conditions markets 
(Kelly 2009). The degree of partisan conflict affects the efficacy of these methods in affecting 
income inequality. In the twentieth century, the entry of the United States into World War II 
marked a significant change in the role of the U.S. federal government in the economy. 
                                                 
1 Gogas, Gupta, Miller, Papadimitriou, and Sarantitis (2017) described this series of "Great" episodes. 
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Moreover, the ability of the federal government to intervene effectively in the economy 
generally requires the willingness of the two major parties to compromise on legislation. 
Partisan conflict may have contributed to the movement in unionization rates, immigration 
flows, trade liberalization, and the decline in the real minimum wage cited above. 
Polarization between the two major political parties should drive the partisan conflict to 
higher levels. The political atmosphere in the United States during the post-WWII period 
exhibited significant transformation (see McCarty, et al., 2003), where polarization and partisan 
transformation in the Southern states experienced increase in policy strategy of the Republicans 
and Democrats. The existing literature documents that the bipartisan agreement among the 
Congress regarding economic issues (see Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; McCarty et al., 1997) that 
spread over the 1960s period, stirred up the deep dogmatic divisions experienced in the 1990s. 
In addition, the literature argues that the formerly orthogonal disputes have been integrated into 
the conflicts over economic conservatism and liberalism. More especially, issues of economic 
and social class have become an integral part of the main ideological conflicts over 
redistribution (see Stone, 1973; Abramowitz, 1994; Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Valentino 
and Sears, 2005; Shafer and Johnson, 2009; Tesler and Sears, 2010; Tesler, 2012). 
Azzimonti (2015) considers the effect of partisan conflict on private investment, and 
found an inverse relationship between partisan conflict and investment. The combination of 
divided government and increasing polarization triggered a higher level of fiscal uncertainty in 
the United States. Partisan conflict can affect investment in two major ways. On the one hand, 
the expected return on investment is unpredictable, when size, timing, and basic components 
of fiscal policy are highly uncertain. As such, the option value of investment, which is largely 
irreversible, rises, causing delays in pulling the trigger on investment decisions. On the other 
hand, a higher level of partisan conflict can lead to the inability of the government to respond 
to negative shocks and to implement policy reforms to offset or reverse those negative shocks 
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(see Alesina and Drazen, 1991). This reduces the expected rate of return on investment, 
discourages investment, and leads to higher inequality. Thus, we hypothesize that a higher 
partisan conflict indirectly causes higher inequality. 
The partisan-conflict and inequality trends interestingly move together over the years. 
According to McCarty et al. (2003), partisan conflict measures the disparity between the 
Democratic and Republican parties on a liberal-conservative scale. The proximity of the swings 
in these two variables, however, is striking. In fact, we can observe a direct relationship between 
partisan conflict and income inequality, depending on the level of political polarization between 
the two parties. For instance, the positive effect of partisan conflict on inequality can occur as 
follows. High political polarization between the two parties stimulates economic instability, 
which produces lower investment and employment. Finally, the resulting declines in output and 
growth, hence, widen the inequality gap. Banerjee (2004) also argues that there exists a link 
between investment and inequality, especially in the absence of perfect markets. Partisan 
conflict inversely affects investment (i.e., the higher the partisan conflict, the lower the level of 
investment), which, in turn, lowers real income and economic growth, especially when 
expected return on investment is unpredictable.  In a nutshell, a higher partisan conflict lowers 
investment that, in turn, reduces growth and widens the inequality gap.  
A few existing studies on the relationship between partisan conflict and income 
inequality/distribution exist. McCarty et al. (2003), using party polarization and the Gini 
coefficient to proxy for partisanship and income inequality, find that partisanship is highly 
stratified by income in the United States. Anderson and Barimundi (2008), in a comparative 
analysis that uses democracy, inequality, and representation measures, argue that a nation’s 
political system and institutions play a vital role in determining levels of income inequality in 
society. Similarly, Pontusson and Rueda (2008), using income inequality and political 
polarization measures for twelve OECD countries, examine how income inequality influences 
5 
 
 5 
politics, especially government policy. On the other hand, Finseraas (2010) investigates how 
political polarization in a non-economic dimension influences redistribution. This study argues 
that high party polarization in a non-economic policy dimension alters the political response, 
thus, widening income inequality. None of these studies, however, investigates the causal 
relationships between income inequality and partisan conflict, using either the newly developed 
partisan conflict index (PCI) to proxy for partisanship or non-parametric causality-in-quantile 
econometric techniques in their various analyses.  
The current study investigates this causality relationship from partisan conflict to 
income inequality and vice-versa in the United States, using the PCI data and non-parametric 
causality-in-quantile test recently introduced by Balcilar, et al. (2016). We employ annual data 
from 1917 to 2013, or 97 observations. The sample period ends at 2013 based on unavailability 
of updated PCI data.  
The causality-in-quantile test technique as introduced by Balcilar et al. (2016) is robust 
based on the following factors. First, this technique discovers the dependence framework of the 
time series under observation by using non-parametric estimation, thus reducing or eliminating 
the possibility of model misspecification errors. Second, this approach permits the evaluation 
of both causality-in-mean and causality-in-variance. Thus, this test can examine higher-order 
dependency, which is regarded as a crucial factor, since a possibility exists of no causal 
relationship in the conditional mean for certain periods. Higher-order dependency, however, 
may exist in the same period even though causality in the mean does not exist. Third, this paper 
is the first to investigate the predictability of the PCI on income inequality with the non-
parametric, causality-in-quantile approach. Empirical results from this current study show that 
the PCI does Granger cause income inequality. More specifically, a reduction in the PCI leads 
to a reduction in our measures of income inequality. This causality effect, however, does not 
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exist at the upper end of the quantile distribution. The effect grows as the level of the PCI falls 
(weakens). This study applies this new, sound, robust, and reliable econometric technique.  
The contribution of this study is of twofold. First, unlike other studies that make use of 
party-income stratification models, we employ a non-parametric causality-in-quantile testing 
techniques, which allows robust examination of causality relationships between 
macroeconomic variables. Thus, we can evaluate the useful predictive relationship of the PCI 
under different income inequality measures. That is, we will determine whether the PCI does 
predict income inequality, or does not. Second, we employ a novel non-parametric causality-
in-quantile test for the causal nexus, if it exists, as proposed by Balcilar et al. (2016) to examine 
whether the PCI causes income inequality. Balcilar et al. (2016) causality tests combines 
nonlinear causality of order k-th proposed by Nishiyama, et al. (2011) and the quantile test 
developed by Jeong, et al. (2012). Thus, Balcilar et al. (2016) provides an advanced version of 
the other quantile tests previously developed.  
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the paper's methodology in 
detail. Section 3 presents the data and brief describes the variables. Section 4 analyzes the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
We adopt the novel techniques proposed by Balcilar et al. (2016), a method built on the model 
structure of Nishiyama et al. (2011) and Jeong et al. (2012). This method effectively identifies 
nonlinear causality via a hybrid approach. Designate the level of income inequality by 𝑦𝑡, and 
the PCI by  𝑥𝑡. Define the quantile-type causality based on Jeong et al. (2012) as follows.
2 In 
the 𝜃-quantile with regards to the lag-vector of {𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝, 𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑡−𝑝}, 𝑥𝑡 does not cause 
 𝑦𝑡, if  
                                                 
2 The explanation in this section nearly follows Nishiyama et al. (2011) and Jeong et al. (2012). 
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𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝, 𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑡−𝑝) = 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝).  (1) 
In the 𝜃-quantile with regards to the lag-vector of {𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝, 𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑡−𝑝}, 𝑥𝑡 causes 𝑦𝑡, 
if  
𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝, 𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑡−𝑝) ≠ 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝)  (2) 
We depict 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡| ∙) as the 𝜃-th quantile of  𝑦𝑡, while the conditional quantiles of  𝑦𝑡, 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡| ∙),  
rely on t and the quantiles are confined between zero and one (i.e., 0 < 𝜃 < 1). 
To develop a brief and concise presentation of the causality-in-quantiles tests, we 
specify the following vectors:  𝑌𝑡−1 = (𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝), 𝑋𝑡−1 = (𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑡−𝑝), and 𝑍𝑡 =
(𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡). We also specify the conditional distribution functions as 𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1) and 
 𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1), which represent the distribution functions of 𝑦𝑡 conditioned on vectors 𝑍𝑡−1 
and  𝑌𝑡−1, respectively. We propose that the conditional distribution 𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1) proves 
continuous in 𝑦𝑡 for all 𝑍𝑡−1. Thus, specifying 𝑄𝜃(𝑍𝑡−1) = 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1)and 𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) =
𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1), we observe that  𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1{𝑄𝜃(𝑍𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} = 𝜃, which holds with probability one. 
Consequently, we test the hypotheses for the causality-in-quantiles that depend on equations 
(1) and (2) as follows: 
𝐻0:   𝑃{𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1{𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} = 𝜃} = 1 and  (3) 
𝐻1:   𝑃{𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1{𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} = 𝜃} < 1  (4) 
Jeong et al. (2012), trying to specify a measurable metric for the practical application 
of the causality-in-quantiles tests, use the distance measure 𝐽 = {𝜀𝑡𝐸(𝜀𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1)𝑓𝑍(𝑍𝑡−1)}, where 
𝜀𝑡 depicts the regression error and 𝑓𝑍(𝑍𝑡−1) depicts the marginal density function of  𝑍𝑡−1. 
Hence, the causality-in-quantiles test builds on the regression error  𝜀𝑡. We generate this 
regression error 𝜀𝑡 due to the null hypothesis stated in equation (3). This hypothesis is true, only 
if  𝐸[𝟏{𝑦𝑡 ≤ 𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1}] = 𝜃. That is, we can rescript the regression error as 𝟏{𝑦𝑡 ≤
8 
 
 8 
𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)} = 𝜃 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝟏{∙} is a signal function. Moreover, following Jeong et al. (2012), 
we can specify the distance metric, based on the regression error, as follows: 
𝐽 = 𝐸 [{𝐹𝑦𝑡|𝑍𝑡−1{𝑄𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑡−1} − 𝜃}
2
𝑓𝑍(𝑍𝑡−1)].  (5) 
In accordance with equation (3) and (4), note that 𝐽 ≥ 0. This assertion will persist with an 
equality (i.e., 𝐽 = 0) only if the null hypothesis [i.e., 𝐻0 specified in equation (3)] is true. But, 
𝐽 > 0 holds under the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 defined in equation (4). The realistic match of 
the distance measure 𝐽 defined in equation (5) hands us a kernel-based causality-in-quantiles 
test statistic for the fixed quantile 𝜃 is specified as follows:  
                𝐽𝑇 =
1
𝑇(𝑇 − 1)ℎ2𝑝
∑ ∑ 𝐾 (
𝑍𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝑠−1
ℎ
) 𝜀?̂?𝜀?̂? 
𝑇
𝑠=𝑝+1,𝑠≠𝑡
  ,                    
𝑇
𝑡=𝑝+1
 
(6) 
where 𝑇 denotes the sample size, 𝐾(⋅) represent a known kernel function, ℎ represents 
the bandwidth for the kernel estimation, and 𝑝 denotes the lag-order applied in specifying the 
vector  𝑍𝑡. Jeong et al. (2012) in their analysis, however, confirm that the re-scaled statistic 
𝑇ℎ𝑝𝐽𝑇/?̂?0 is asymptotically distributed as standard normal, where ?̂?0 = √2𝜃(1 −
𝜃)√1/(𝑇(𝑇 − 1)ℎ2𝑝)√∑ 𝐾2((𝑍𝑡−1 − 𝑍𝑠−1)/ℎ𝑡≠𝑠 ). The regression error 𝜀?̂?  becomes the most 
important element of the test statistic  𝐽𝑇. In our study, the estimator of the unknown regression 
error is specified as follows: 
𝜀?̂? = 𝟏{𝑦𝑡 ≤ ?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1)} − 𝜃.  (7) 
In equation (7), the quantile estimator ?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) produce an estimate of the 𝜃-th 
conditional quantile of 𝑦𝑡 considering 𝑌𝑡−1. By employing the nonparametric kernel approach, 
we evaluate ?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) as follows: 
?̂?𝜃(𝑌𝑡−1) = ?̂?𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1
−1 (𝜃|𝑌𝑡−1)   
(8) 
Here, ?̂?𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1) signifies the Nadarya-Watson kernel estimator specified as follows: 
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?̂?𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1) =
∑ 𝐿(
𝑌𝑡−1−𝑌𝑠−1
ℎ
) 𝟏{𝑦𝑠≤𝑦𝑡}
𝑇
𝑠=𝑝+1,𝑠≠𝑡
∑ 𝐿(
𝑌𝑡−1−𝑌𝑠−1
ℎ
)𝑇𝑠=𝑝+1,𝑠≠𝑡
,    (9) 
where ℎ is the bandwidth  and 𝐿(∙) represents a known kernel function. 
In addition, the empirical implementation of causality testing via quantiles necessitates 
distinguishing three critical options: the bandwidth ℎ, the kernel type for 𝐾(∙) and 𝐿(∙) in 
equations (6) and (9), and the lag order 𝑝. For this paper, we use a lag order of 1 based on the 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) through the vector autoregressive (VAR) model involving 
the PCI and income inequality. The SIC lag-length selection criteria helps to overcome the issue 
of over-parameterization commonly encountered when applying the nonparametric 
frameworks, since the SIC produces a parsimonious number of lags when compared to 
alternative lag-length selection criteria.3 Meanwhile, we determine the bandwidth by using the 
Least Squares Cross-Validation (LSCV) technique.4 Finally, we employ 𝐾(∙) and 𝐿(∙) 
Gaussian-type kernels for our estimation. 
Although robust inference on the quantile based causality from the PCI to measures of 
inequality can reflect the causality-in-quantiles tests given in equation (5), it is also interesting 
to estimate the magnitude and direction of the effects of the PCI on inequality at various 
quantiles. Variations in the sign and magnitude of the effect across quantiles will reveal 
significant evidence on the effect of the PCI on income inequality. We employ a commonly 
used measure for this purpose -- the first-order partial derivative. Estimation of the partial 
derivatives for nonparametric models can experience complications because nonparametric 
methods exhibit slow convergence rates, which can depend on the dimensionality and 
smoothness of the underlying conditional expectation function. Our interest, as in many 
                                                 
3 Hurvich and Tsai (1989) examine the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and show that it is biased towards 
selecting an over-parameterized model, while the SIC is asymptotically consistent. 
4 For each quantile, we determine the bandwidth ℎ using the leave-one-out least-squares cross validation method 
of Racine and Li (2004) and Li and Racine (2004). 
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applications, does not involve the entire derivative curve but rather a statistic that summarizes 
the overall effect or the global curvature (i.e., the global sign and magnitude).   
A natural measure of the global curvature is the average derivative (AD). We use the 
conditional pivotal quantile, based on approximation or the coupling approach of Belloni et al. 
(2011), to estimate the partial ADs. The pivotal coupling approach additionally can 
approximate the distribution of AD using Monte Carlo simulation. To show the details of the 
AD estimation, define 𝑥𝑡 as the key variable for which we want to evaluate the derivative of 𝑦𝑡 
and define 𝑅𝑡 = (𝑥𝑡, 𝑣𝑡), where 𝑣𝑡 is a vector of other covariates, which includes lagged values 
in our case. Following Belloni et al. (2011), we can model the 𝜃-th quantile of 𝑦𝑡 conditional 
on 𝑅𝑡 using the partially linear quantile model: 
𝑄𝜃|𝑅𝑡(𝑦𝑡|𝑅𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑥𝑡, 𝜃) + 𝑣𝑡
′𝛾(𝜃).
                                                  
(10) 
Belloni et al. (2011) develop a series approximation to 𝑄𝜃|𝑅𝑡(𝑦𝑡|𝑅𝑡) in equation (8), which we 
can represent as follows: 
𝑄𝜃|𝑅𝑡(𝑦𝑡|𝑅𝑡) ≈ 𝑊(𝑅𝑡)
′𝛽(𝜃),    𝛽(𝜃) = (𝛼(𝜃)′, 𝛾(𝜃))
′
,   𝑊(𝑅𝑡) = (𝑊(𝑥𝑡), 𝑣𝑡
′)′.
          
(11) 
In equation (11), we approximate the unknown function 𝑓(𝑥𝑡, 𝜃) by linear combinations 
of the series terms 𝑊(𝑥𝑡)𝛼(𝜃)
′. Ideally, 𝑊(𝑥𝑡) should include transformations of 𝑥𝑡 that 
possess good approximation properties. The transformations 𝑊(𝑥𝑡) may include polynomials, 
B-splines, and trigonometric terms. Once we define the transformations 𝑊(𝑥𝑡), we can 
generate the first order derivative with respect to 𝑥𝑡 as follows:  
ℎ(𝑥𝑡, 𝜃) = 𝜕𝑄𝜃|𝑅𝑡(𝑦𝑡|𝑅𝑡) 𝜕𝑥𝑡⁄ = 𝜕𝑓(𝑥𝑡, 𝜃) 𝜕𝑥𝑡⁄ = 𝑊(𝑥𝑡)𝛼(𝜃)
′ 𝜕𝑥⁄
𝑡
.
  
(12) 
Based on the first-order derivative estimates in equation (12), we can derive the first-order AD 
with respect to 𝑥𝑡 as follows: 
 ℎ̅(𝜃) = ∫
𝜕𝑓(𝑥𝑡,𝜃)
𝜕𝑥𝑡
𝑑𝜇(𝑥𝑡), (13) 
11 
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where 𝜇(𝑥𝑡) is the distribution function of 𝑥𝑡. We approximate the distribution of ℎ̅(𝜃) using 
50,000 Monte Carlo simulations and construct 95% confidence intervals based on the empirical 
distribution. The pivotal coupling approximation with Monte Carlo simulation also allows us 
to test the hypothesis for the AD estimate in equation (13).5 In particular, we test the null 
hypotheses that the effect of the PCI on the inequality measure is negative for all 𝜃, 𝐻0: ℎ̅(𝜃) ≤
0 for all 𝜃, positive for all 𝜃, 𝐻0: ℎ̅(𝜃) ≥ 0 for all 𝜃, and zero for all 𝜃, 𝐻0: ℎ̅(𝜃) = 0 for all 𝜃. 
The point wise inference uses the t-statistic at each quantile index and covariate value, while 
the confidence intervals use the maximal t-statistic across all values of the covariates and 
quantile indices in the region of interest. We use a 10th-order polynomial of 𝑥𝑡 to 
construct 𝑊(𝑥𝑡).   
3. Data and description of variables 
For our empirical analysis, we employ aggregate annual frequency data for the United States 
between the periods 1917 to 2013, based on data availability. The PCI data comes from 
Azzimonti (2014). Recent studies of Azzimonti (2016), Cheng, et al. (2016), Hankins, et al. 
(2016), and Gupta, et al. (forthcoming) also uses the PCI data in their various empirical 
analyses. Azzimonti (2016) employs the PCI data to examine the relationship between news, 
investor’s expectation, and partisan conflict in the United States. Cheng et al. (2016) use the 
PCI data to investigate whether U.S. partisan conflict matters in European countries, while 
Gupta et al. (forthcoming) use the PCI data to examine the role of partisan conflict in affecting 
asset prices and fiscal policy in the United States. Meanwhile, our current study adds to the 
existing literature that uses the PCI data by examining the causal relationship between partisan 
                                                 
5 In general, the process √𝑇(?̂?(𝜃) − 𝛼(𝜃)) does not heave a limit distribution; therefore standard asymptotic 
theory does allow one to test these hypotheses (van der Vaart and Wellner, 1996). In the coupling approach, a 
process with a known distribution is constructed that lies in the same probability space with √𝑇(?̂?(𝜃) − 𝛼(𝜃)) 
and two processes are uniformly close to each other with high probability. We can, then, perform tests based on 
the constructed coupling process that has a known distribution.      
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conflict and income inequality in the United States. Our study provides a basis for action by 
policymakers who design, formulate, and execute macroeconomic policies. While partisan 
conflict is inevitable and necessary for sound functioning of a democracy, policymakers should 
avoid heightened conflict as it will increase income inequality, given that higher partisan 
conflict will negatively affect investment and prevent the development of policies in a timely-
manner to respond to adverse macro shocks.  
This index tracks the magnitude of political differences among U.S. politicians, mainly 
at the federal level, by gauging or evaluating the frequency and persistence of newspaper 
articles (dailies) divulging disagreement, especially within a month. High index values imply 
conflict between the political parties, Congress, and the President of the United States. The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Research (FRBPR) developed the PCI data, where the 
index usually rises close to elections and particularly during debates over divisive issues such 
as foreign policy, budget deficits, and so on. The basic trends in the PCI, based on an HP filter, 
are as follows: the PCI trends downward from the beginning of the sample in 1891 through the 
early 1920s, it stabilized and did not trend up or down from the early 1920s through the mid-
1960s, and it rose from the mid-1960s through the end of the sample in 2013 (see Azzimonti, 
2014, p. 7-8). 
Empirical findings suggest that an increase in the PCI widens and promoting 
uncertainty, which halts or retards economic activities and performance by slowing consumer 
spending and adversely influencing businesses, and affecting domestic or foreign investment 
(see Azzimonti, 2014). These effects produce a widening of the income inequality gap. In 
addition, income inequality data come from Frank (2015)6. More specifically, the income 
                                                 
6 For an exposition on the estimation of this series and file including percentile threshold, see the PDF by Frank, 
Sommeiller, Price, and Saez posted at the following site: http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html. Further 
explanation on estimation of other measures of income share or distribution should see Frank (2015).  
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inequality measures (e.g., gini, Artkin05, RMeanDev, and Theil) and the Top 10%, Top 5%, 
Top 1%, Top 0.5%, Top 0.1% and Top 0.01% income inequality measures appear in the World 
Top Income Database (WTID). 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
We present the crucial points of the time series data under observation in Table 1. We 
report the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, Skewness, Kurtosis, the 
Ljung-Box first {Q(1)} and the fourth {Q(4)} autocorrelation tests, the Jarque-Bera (JB) 
normality test, the first {ARCH(1)} and the fourth {ARCH(4)} order of Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) tests basically for the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) for the PCI, 
and the observed income inequality and distribution measures. The positive skewness may 
reflect the increases in the PCI and income inequalities disparities. On the other hand, the 
Kurtosis indicates a flat tailed distribution for the time series. That is, the crucial findings are 
that the variables exhibit positive skewness and negative kurtosis, resulting in a non-normal 
distribution (i.e., the variables show a highly nonlinear relationship). The data confirm this by 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of normal distribution, using the Jarque and Bera (1980) 
normality test at the 1- or 5-percent significance level. This justifies the causality-in-quantile 
test by the flat tailed distribution of the time-series variables. Note that we observe serial 
correlation between the PCI and all the income inequality measures using the Ljung-Box (1978) 
statistic that are statistically significant at the 1-percent level. Finally, we confirm ARCH effects 
in the variables, as reported in the ARCH-LM test, rejecting the null hypothesis at the 1-percent 
level. 
4. Results and empirical findings 
This section reports the empirical results. We investigate the causality-in-quantiles predictive 
relationship from the PCI to income inequality. We estimate the linear Granger causality test 
built on a Linear Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. Table 2 reports the results of the linear 
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Granger causality tests under the null hypothesis that the PCI does not Granger cause inequality. 
We choose the order (p) of the VAR by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). Out of 10 
indicators of income inequality, three measures exhibit weak significance at the 10% level. 
Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality at the 10% level for three measures 
of income inequality. That is, we find limited evidence of significant predictability running 
from the PCI to income inequality in a linear vector autoregressive (VAR) model. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Using the non-parametric causality-in-quantile techniques, we now evaluate whether a 
nonlinear dependence exists between the PCI and income inequality. For this purpose, we 
employ a test for independence proposed by Broock, et al. (1996), known as the BDS test on 
the residuals of first-order vector autoregressive [VAR (1)] model for both series. We conduct 
the BDS test on the residuals of the PCI and income inequality indicators equation in the first-
order vector autoregressive model. In Table 3, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
identically independently distributed (i.i.d) for all residuals at different embedding dimensions 
(m), especially for the income inequality indicators, even when we found statistical significant 
evidence against linearity. Thus, we posit that strong higher-level evidence of nonlinearity in 
income inequality and the PCI exists. By implication, evaluating linear Granger causality test 
framework when the data conform to a highly nonlinear model can lead to spurious, unreliable, 
and inconsistent outcomes. Thus, we apply the causality-in-quantile test, which can account for 
outliers, jumps, nonlinear dependence, and structural breaks, since we confirm the absence of 
linearity among the series. 
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Furthermore, the evidence of nonlinearity, leads to an examination of the possible 
existence of nonlinear Granger causality running from the PCI to income inequality. We 
employ the nonlinear Granger causality test of Diks and Panchenko (2006)7. Table 4 reports 
the Diks and Panchenko nonlinear Granger causality test results, where we use the embedding 
dimension (m) in their robust order against the lag length used in the estimation. Table 4 shows 
that no evidence supports the null hypothesis of no full sample nonlinear Granger causality 
relationship running from the PCI to income inequality. This outcome holds for all embedding 
dimensions used. In Table 5, we present one- and two-sided tests for the sign of the effect. For 
the sign tests, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of a negative sign; we cannot reject the null 
of a positive sign; and we weakly reject the null hypothesis of a zero effect (rejection of the last 
hypothesis only occurs mostly at the 10% significance level). 
Finding evidence against a full sample nonlinear Granger causality relationship, we 
proceed to nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test. This test accounts not only for the center 
of the distribution but all quantiles of the distribution. Figure 1 shows time-series plots of the 
PCI and income inequality. We observe some extreme jump (high value of income inequality) 
between the years 1925-1928 in the level of income inequality. Figure 2 reports the results of 
the quantile causality from the PCI to income inequality series. Also, Figure 3 plots the average 
derivative estimates for the effect of the PCI. The quantiles appear on the horizontal axis, while 
the nonparametric causality test statistics appear on the vertical axis, proportional to the 
quantiles in the horizontal axis. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
                                                 
7 See Diks and Panchenko (2006) for more details. The test adjust for the over-rejection problem noticed in 
Hiemstra and Jones (1994). 
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In Figure 2, the horizontal thin lines identify the 5-percent significance level. According 
to Figure 2, we find evidence of strong causality across a wide range of quantiles from the PCI 
to income inequality. We reject the null hypothesis of no causality for quantiles generally below 
0.65 or up to 0.80. Given that we transform the data into natural logarithm first differences,8 
the PCI only fails to Granger cause at extreme quantiles. The upper quantiles correspond to 
those high jump values of income inequality (i.e., between 1925 and 1928) discussed earlier 
and we do not find Granger causality at those extremes.9  
The plots of the data and the relationship among the variables of interest provide an 
explanation as to why no evidence of useful predictability from the PCI to income inequality 
measures exists at the upper quantiles of the variables. As we noted earlier, the no rejection 
ranges of the quantiles for the causality relationship correspond to quantiles above either 0.65 
or 0.80 for income inequalities. Higher levels of inequality fall in the quantiles above these 
ranges. During the periods where income inequalities experience big jumps and we see a high 
level of the PCI, then the PCI does not significantly affect average income inequality. This 
result supports the findings of McCarty et al. (2003). 
We observe robust causal relationships running from the PCI to income inequality 
measures, barring the upper end of the conditional distribution of inequality growth, across the 
various measures of the same. A researcher who examines only the mean of the conditional 
distribution of income inequality would conclude that the PCI does not cause income inequality, 
                                                 
8 All the data are non-stationary at level. 
9 Based on the suggestion of an anonymous referee to accommodate for the possibility of an important omitted 
variable such as real GDP per capita growth (Chang et al., 2016), we undertook an indirect approach of testing the 
robustness of our causality-in-quantiles test. Unlike linear tests of causality, which can be multivariate, all known 
nonlinear tests of causality are, in fact, bivariate (see, for example, Heimstra and Jones (1994), Diks and Panchenko 
(2005, 2006), Nishiyama et al., (2011), Jeong et al., (2012)). Our indirect approach involves two steps: First, we 
estimate a linear causality model with economic growth only in the regression involving inequality growth. 
Second, we recover the residuals from these models and apply our nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test on 
these residuals, with PCI growth as the predictor. So, we create a filtered series for the inequality growth, whose 
movements are now no longer due to the GDP growth. In general, our results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Figure 2. Complete details of these results are available upon request from the authors. 
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even if nonlinearity is modeled. Using the causality-in-quantiles test, however, we show that in 
fact the PCI does predict inequality, barring the upper end of the conditional distribution of 
inequality.  Our results, thus, not only highlight the importance of modeling nonlinearity 
through the nonparametric approach, but also going beyond the conditional mean based 
approach to study the entire conditional distribution of the dependent variable under 
consideration. 
Finally, this result also confirms the results in Chang, et al. (2015) on the causality nexus 
between real GDP and income inequality in the United States, where the direction of causality 
evolves over time and differs across frequencies. The results shown in Figure 2 reveal that the 
evidence of causality from the PCI to income inequality measures exhibits concave-shaped 
distribution patterns across quantiles. The concave-shaped pattern of causality results from 
using a nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test. The effect of the PCI on income inequalities 
measure is generally positive; where reductions in the PCI lead to a reduction in our measures 
of income inequality, and vice versa. 
5. Conclusion 
The existing literature examines the relationship between partisan conflict and various 
macroeconomics variables. This study adds to the existing literature by investigating the 
causality relationship, if any, between the PCI and income inequality. We use annual time-
series data to evaluate the standard linear Granger causality test, and found no significant 
causality evidence. Nonlinearity tests show that the relationship between the PCI and income 
inequality follows a highly nonlinear relationship. The linear causality test is prone to model 
misspecification and may result in spurious and unreliable inferences. We employ 
nonparametric causality-in-quantile test approach to avoid these problems, integrating the test 
for nonlinear causality of k-th order proposed by Nishiyama et al. (2011) with the Jeong et al. 
(2012) causality-in-quantiles test.  
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The nonparametric causality tests indicate that the PCI exerts a strong causal link to the 
income inequality. The null hypothesis that the PCI does not Granger cause income inequality 
is strongly rejected. The outcomes of the relationship between the PCI and the income 
inequality generally indicate the importance of detecting and modelling nonlinearity when 
investigating causal relationships. 
In addition, the concave-shaped form in the causality-in-quantiles tests, which we 
observe from the PCI to income inequality test, demonstrate that strong causal effects occur, in 
general, for moderate income inequality rather than high income inequality. The findings of 
this study, however, do not rule out the possibility that other factors such as wage/income 
differences, trade, technology, institutions, and growth volatility (see Piketty and Saez, 2003; 
Frank, 2009; Fang, et al. 2015; Rubin and Segal, 2015) contribute to the level income 
inequality. Rather, our findings emphasize that policymakers who design, formulate, and 
execute macroeconomic policies should examine the entire conditional distribution of income 
inequality, when considering the causal effects of the PCI on income inequality.  
We can infer several crucial facts from this analysis, which policymakers who design 
and structure growth and developmental programs may find useful. Our study links the PCI to 
income inequality. Thus, when considering income inequality, specific measure of political 
polarization should receive consideration. The effect of the PCI on income inequality, however, 
evolves over time. Moreover, we also failed to reject the null hypothesis of no causal 
relationship at the upper quantiles of the income inequality. Thus, our findings suggest that 
causal relationship from the PCI to income inequality does not exist in periods with high income 
inequality.  
Finally, PCI can be included in the decision-making support systems, such as, for 
example, in Duclos and Araar (2006). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 PCI Gini Atkin05 RMeanDev Theil Top10 Top5 Top1 Top05 Top01 
Mean 65.33 0.22 0.70 0.59 39.79 28.53 14.53 11.03 5.83 2.32 
S.D. 24.43 0.05 0.10 0.22 5.66 5.23 4.14 3.65 2.56 1.32 
Min 34.01 0.14 0.53 0.36 32.31 21.66 8.86 6.07 2.56 0.85 
Max 131.59 0.33 0.92 1.08 50.60 38.82 23.94 19.40 12.28 6.04 
Skewness 0.69 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.21 0.29 0.42 0.49 0.72 1.06 
Kurtosis -0.65 -0.84 -1.13 -0.94 -1.49 -1.31 -0.93 -0.81 -0.46 0.14 
JB 9.4*** 11.2*** 8.2** 12.0*** 9.4*** 7.9** 6.2** 6.4** 9.3*** 18.8*** 
Q(1) 68.6*** 86.3*** 86.2*** 85.9*** 90.27*** 88.8*** 85.6*** 84.3*** 82.2*** 80.0*** 
Q(4) 246.6*** 271.1*** 274.2*** 271.9*** 309.7*** 302.4*** 278.0*** 269.8*** 255.2*** 240.9*** 
ARCH(1) 26.6*** 69.8*** 73.77*** 54.5*** 58.1*** 55.0*** 49.3*** 47.8*** 46.5*** 46.1*** 
ARCH(4) 40.0*** 70.1*** 75.2*** 55.8*** 57.0*** 53.9*** 49.7*** 48.3*** 46.9*** 46.5*** 
Note:  Table reports the descriptive statistics for the PCI and inequality series Gini Coefficient (Gini), Atkinson Index (Atkin05), the 
Relative Mean Deviation (RMeanDev), Theil’s entropy Index (Theil) as well as Top 10 percent (Top10), Top 5 percent (Top5), 
Top 1 percent (Top1), Top 0.5 percent (Top05), Top 0.1 percent (Top01), and Top 0.01 percent (Top001) income shares.  Data 
is at annual frequency and covers the period from 1917 to 2013 with 97 observations. In addition to the mean, the standard 
deviation (S.D.), minimum (min), maximum (max), skewness, and kurtosis statistics, the table reports the Jarque-Bera normality 
test (JB), the Ljung-Box first [Q(1)] and the fourth [Q(4)] autocorrelation tests, and the first [ARCH(1)] and the fourth 
[ARCH(4)] order Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests for the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH). The *** and ** 
represent significance at the 1- and 5-percent levels.  
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Table 2:  Linear Granger causality tests of the hypothesis that PCI 
does not Granger cause inequality series 
Inequality Series F-statistic Order of the VAR (p) 
Gini 2.88* 1 
Atkin05 2.634 1 
RMeanDev 3.76* 1 
Theil 2.91* 1 
Top10 0.00 1 
Top5 0.15 1 
Top1 0.85 1 
Top05 0.95 1 
Top01 1.42 1 
Top001 1.97 1 
Note:  The table reports the F-statistic for the no Granger causality restrictions 
imposed on a linear vector autoregressive (VAR) model under the null 
hypotheses H0. The order (p) of the VAR is selected by the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC).  ***, **, and * indicates rejection of the null of no 
Granger causality at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level of significance, respectively.   
 
 
Table 3:  BDS Test  
Equation for: m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 
Gini 7.47*** 9.73*** 12.23*** 16.46*** 21.26*** 
Atkin05 6.18*** 7.25*** 9.19*** 12.50*** 17.39*** 
RMeanDev 6.97*** 8.62*** 9.97*** 12.25*** 14.47*** 
Theil 2.43** 3.52*** 5.98*** 8.31*** 11.77*** 
Top10 3.08*** 2.97*** 5.19*** 10.19*** 16.12*** 
Top5 4.47*** 2.81*** 3.62*** 5.09*** 4.94*** 
Top1 0.70 -2.14** -1.25 -1.54 -2.49** 
Top05 0.23 -2.24** -1.21 -1.25 -1.01 
Top01 0.29 -0.25 0.36 -0.04 -2.56** 
Top001 1.19 0.93 2.16** 3.75*** 3.22*** 
Note:  The entries indicate the BDS test [Brock et al. (1996)] based on the residuals from the equation for 
inequality series in a VAR for various inequality series. m denotes the embedding dimension of the BDS 
test. ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null of residuals being iid at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels of 
significance, respectively.  
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Table 4: Nonlinear Granger Causality Test 
 m=2  m=3  m=4 
Equation for: Test statistic p-value  Test statistic p-value  Test statistic p-value 
Gini -0.963 0.832  -1.286 0.901  -0.307 0.620 
Atkin05 -0.861 0.805  0.483 0.314  0.078 0.469 
RMeanDev -0.653 0.743  -1.374 0.915  -0.317 0.624 
Theil -0.784 0.784  0.170 0.433  -0.146 0.558 
Top10 -0.426 0.665  -0.882 0.811  -0.167 0.566 
Top5 -0.620 0.732  -0.674 0.750  -0.054 0.521 
Top1 -0.504 0.693  -0.608 0.728  0.778 0.218 
Top05 -0.544 0.707  -0.701 0.758  0.754 0.226 
Top01 -0.606 0.728  -1.105 0.865  0.140 0.444 
Top001 0.196 0.422  0.627 0.265  -0.374 0.646 
Note:  The m denotes the embedding dimension. For test, see Diks and Panchenko (2006). 
   
 
Table 5:  Sign tests for the effect of PCI on inequality measures 
 𝐻0: ℎ̅(𝜃) ≤ 0 for all 𝜃 𝐻0: ℎ̅(𝜃) ≥ 0 for all 𝜃 𝐻0: ℎ̅(𝜃) = 0 for all 𝜃 
Equation for: Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value 
Gini 2.637** 0.040 2.637 0.940 2.637* 0.081 
Atkin05 2.911** 0.045 2.911 0.955 2.911* 0.068 
RMeanDev 2.828** 0.043 2.828 0.947 2.828* 0.073 
Theil 1.818** 0.010 1.818 0.899 1.818* 0.063 
Top10 1.482** 0.025 1.482 0.975 1.482* 0.082 
Top5 2.550*** 0.005 2.550 0.995 2.550** 0.039 
Top1 1.633*** 0.004 1.633 0.986 1.633* 0.053 
Top05 1.396*** 0.006 1.396 0.987 1.396* 0.083 
Top01 1.488*** 0.003 1.488 0.997 1.488* 0.069 
Top001 2.214*** 0.006 2.214 0.261 2.214* 0.081 
Note:  The table reports the p-values of the t-statistic obtained from the 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the 
coupling process. ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null at 1-, 5-, and 10-percnet levels of significance, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1: Time series plots of the PCI and inequality series 
Note:  Figure plots the level of the series for the PCI and inequality series Gini Coefficient (Gini), Atkinson 
Index (Atkin05), the Relative Mean Deviation (RMeanDev), Theil’s entropy Index (Theil) as well as Top 
10 percent (Top10), Top 5 percent (Top5), Top 1 percent (Top1), Top 0.5 percent (Top05), Top 0.1 
percent (Top01), and Top 0.01 percent (Top001) income shares. Data is at annual frequency and covers 
the period from 1917 to 2013 with 97 observations. 
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Figure 2. Tests of Granger causality from PCI to inequality series 
Note:  Figure plots the estimates of the nonparametric causality-in-quantiles tests at various quantiles. 
Horizontal thin lines represent the 5-percent value. 
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Figure 3: Average derivative estimates for the effect of PCI 
Note:  Figure plots the estimates of the average derivative estimates. Gray region represents the 95-percent 
confidence interval. A dashed horizontal line is drawn at zero. 
